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THE CRIMINAL AND THE LAW
E. RAY STEVENS*

T

HREE hundred twenty-two years ago, November 17, 1603, the
highest court of England, driven out of London by the plague, sat
at Winchester, the Lord Chief Justice presiding, to try Sir Walter
Raleigh for treason.' He was without counsel, without witnesses, without the right even to be sworn in his own behalf. He had no opportunity to prepare his defense.

He was alone, opposed to the greatest

lawyer of his time, Sir Edward Coke, who was the chief prosecuting
officer.
The chief, it may be said the only, evidence against Raleigh was an
unsigned writing professing to be the confession of an alleged cotraitor, Lord Cobham. Raleigh produced a letter written by Lord
Cobham's own hand repudiating this confession. The only witness
sworn on the trial was a pilot, who testified that, while he was in L.isbon,
some unknown Portuguese said to him that King James "shan never
be crowned; for Don Raleigh and Don Cobham will cut his throat ere
that day come." And this was accepted as proof that Raleigh plotted
the death of the king. Thus, the trial closed without a word of -testimony on behalf of Raleigh, with no chance to present his case, except
as he entered his denials and his protests as this mockery of justice
proceeded.
The evidence adduced against Raleigh was such as would be laifghed
at for its absurdity in a petty larceny case in our age. Bfit Raleigh
-was disliked and distrusted by James I, and the jury promptly returned
-with a verdict of guilty.
Before the sun sank on November 17, 16o3, the Lord Chief Justice
'of England pronounced this sentence upon Raleigh: You shall be
"drawn upon a hurdle through the streets to the place of execution,
there to be hanged and cut down alive, and your body shall be opened,
your heart and bowels plucked out .... and thrown into the fire before
*Justice-Elect, Wisconsin Supreme Court.
12 Howell's State Trials i.
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your eyes; then your head to be stricken from your body, and your
body shall be divided into four quarters to be disposed of at the king's
pleasure. And may God have mercy on your soul."
In the Old Bailey in London on September I, 1670, William Penn,
the founder of Pennsylvania, was on trial charged with preaching and
speaking to a great concourse and tumult of people in the street
"against the peace of the said lord, the king, his crown and dignity."
Penn and his fellow defendant were not permitted to testify. No
lawyer represented them. No witness gave evidence for them. When
they sought to present their case to the jury, they were rudely taken
from the court room, and the trial was completed in their absence.
The jury retired on Saturday. They were kept without "meat, drink,
fire, or any accommodation" until Monday. They rendered two different verdicts which the court would not accept, because they did not find
the defendants guilty of the offense charged. The court attempted to
secure the desired verdict by threatening to starve the jurors, to cut
their noses, and even to cut the throat of a juror named Bushel. At
last, driven to an agreement by hunger and thirst, the jurors returned
a verdict of not guilty. The court was obliged to accept this verdict,
but expressed its displeasure by fining each juror forty marks, and by
committing each to prison until his fine was paid. Penn and his fellow
defendant were found guilty of contempt of court, because, being
Quakers, they had not uncovered their heads in the presence of the
court, and were committed to prison as punishment for their contempt.
These two cases are chosen because they concern two men known to
everyone familiar with American history. They are typical of the
cases found in volume after volume, of the court reports of the years
that precede the establishment of existing rules for the protection of
the accused.
Every means was employed to force jurors to find verdicts of guilty.
The reports contain the record of cases in which jurors, who have
returned a verdict of not guilty, are coerced into finding defendants
guilty of offenses punishable with death.' If such coercion failed, the
jury was punished for returning "an untrue verdict against the king,"
by long imprisonment and by fines, in some cases, amounting to thousands of dollars, large enough to exhaust the estate of the juror.
Before courts composed of judges anxious to serve their master, the
king, by convicting persons whom he accused of crime, and before
jurors under constant fear of severe punishment if they did not find
the defendant guilty, it was truly said: "To be accused of a crime
against the state and to be convicted were almost the same thing."
Many persons accused of crime were kept in prison without bail
'Watts v. Brains, Croke's Reports, Elizabeth, 778-779.
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while the proceeding leading to their conviction was conducted in their
absence, their only right being that of hearing sentence pronounced.
Those who were privileged to attend the trial were almost as helpless
as if confined in some dungeon. They were not permitted to testify in
their own behalf, nor could they have a lawyer to represent them.
Trial by jury came as a substitute for trial by ordeal. It was administered'in an age that had not lost its faith in red hot iron and boiling
water as a means of invoking Divine Judgment as to the guilt or innocence of the accused. It seems to have been assumed that, without
counsel, without witnesses, without any of the rights now guaranteed
to the accused, Divine Providence would bring the innocent through the
fiery furnace of the jury trial unscathed. But it must be confessed that
few were attended by evidence of the Divine assistance shown Shadrach,
Meshach, and Abednego.
Turning from the method of determining guilt to the consequences
that followed the determination of guilt as written in these old codes
of blood, we find more than two hundred offenses punishable by death,
which was often inflicted in the most cruel manner. "Nothing seemed
to be so cheap as human life."
Men saw trial by the lawful judgment of-their peers, guaranteed by
Magna Charta, converted into an instrument to work the will of the
king to find guilty those whom he accused of crime. Aroused to
action by the gross injustice done in the name of the law, every energy
was bent to securely safeguard the rights of the accused. These efforts
were crowned with such success that, today, it is too often difficult to
convict the guilty.
Most of the abuses against which it was sought to protect the accused never existed on American soil. The colonists did not adopt the
barbarous penal codes of England. But they did adopt a mass of
technical rules which were invoked to protect the accused in the days
when despotic kings sought to convict persons innocent of crime. The
traditions of these abuses came with the liberty-loving settlers, who
wove into the warp and woof of their constitutions, the prohibitions
found essential to protect the rights of the accused in Old England.
These constitutional guaranties effectually prevent the recurrence of
such travesties on justice as we saw typified in the trials of William
Penn and of Sir Walter Raleigh. But they go farther. They often
prevent the finding of the truth and the punishment of the guilty. Since
the days of Penn and of Raleigh, these rules have grown from weakness
into the strength of a veritable Old Man of the Sea, bestriding and
strangling the society that labored to give them birth.
Under these constitutional guaranties, criminal codes are too often
interpreted and administered in the light of rules established by humane
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judges in the days when punishment for crime was so severe as to shock
the sense of justice of many of the judges who administered the criminal law. In those early days, as Mr. Justice Peckham said, "it was
natural that technical objections which, perhaps, alone stood between
the criminal and the enforcement of a most severe, if not cruel, penalty,
should be accorded great weight, and that forms and modes of procedure, having no connection with the merits of a particular case, should
be insisted upon as a sort of bulwark of defense against prosecutions
which might otherwise be successful, and which, at the same time, ought
not to succeed. ' 3 But there is no longer reason for maintaining this protecting wall of ancient legal technicalities about the person of the accused. To use the words of Chief Justice Winslow: "The man now
charged with crime is furnished the most complete opportunity for
making his defense ..... The modern law has taken as great pains to
surround the accused person with the means to effectively make his
'4
defense as the ancient law took pains to prevent that consummation.
With much reason did Chief Justice Winslow ask whether the defendant should be permitted to juggle with his constitutional rights and
privileges; whether he should be allowed to play his game with loaded
dice, and whether justice should travel with leaden heel. 5 From the
beginning to the end of the trial these constitutional guaranties give the
accused the advantage. To illustrate, the prosecution must try the
defendant in the county or district where the offense was committed;
it has no choice. But the defendant may waive this' constitutional
guaranty and demand that the place of trial be changed, when he feels
that it will be to his advantage.
Again, in most jurisdictions the defendant may take the testimony of
witnesses anywhere on the face of the globe by deposition and use that
testimony at the trial, but the prosecution, in the absence of such statutes as we have in Wisconsin, is confined to such witnesses as it can
produce in court, who can confront the accused while testifying. In
the days of Raleigh it was necessary in order to protect accused persons
from convictions upon such ex parte confessions as that of Lord Cobham that they be given the right to meet the witnesses against them face
to face. As applied to the modern criminal trial, this rule means that
the accused may gather his evidence from the four corners of the earth,
but that so far as the prosecution is concerned, no person who has committed a crime can be convicted and punished so long as the witnesses,
'Peckham, J. in Crain v. United States. 162 U. S. 625, 646; 40 L. Ed. 1097,
1,03.
'Winslow, C. J. in Hack v. State, 141 Wis. 346, 351-352.
Winslow, C. J. in Hack v. State, 141 Wis. 346, 352.
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who must be called to establish the commission of that crime, remain
outside the territorial limits of the state, whether such absence be
through accident or design.
Because the king punished jurors who found defendants like William
Penn not guilty, while the accused had no redress in case he was convicted, the defendant in the modern criminal trial is given the right to
review, upon appeal, any action taken or proceeding had from the time
of his arrest until sentence is pronounced. The prosecution, on the
contrary, in most jurisdictions, cannot appeal from any ruling or other
proceeding, no matter how erroneous the action of the trial court may
be. Thus the timid or incompetent judge or the corrupt juror may
favor the defendant at every stage of the proceeding, knowing that his
action cannot be reviewed so long as it is favorable to the defendant.
This handicap of the prosecution has been partially removed in a few
jurisdictions, but the state is still powerless to appeal from any ruling
of judgment in a criminal case after the jury has been sworn to try the
defendant, because jeopardy then attaches, and the constitutional provision, that the accused shall not be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense, protects him from being subjected to another trial.
Here again we find the dice heavily loaded to favor the defendant.
Following rules established by humane judges to avoid the necessity of
imposing barbarous punishments, the courts have so interpreted this
constitutional provision as to jeopardy that a defendant, who is granted
a new trial on appeal, cannot be convicted of a higher degree of the
offense charged than that of which he was found guilty on the former
trial. A defendant charged with the murder of his wife was found
guilty of the third degree of manslaughter in Wisconsin. When he
learned that his friends had appealed the case to the supreme court
without consulting him, he wrote Chief Justice Cassoday that the appeal
was taken without his knowledge and that he desired to have it dismissed. But when informed that he could not be found guilty of a
greater offense than third degree manslaughter, if a new trial was
granted, he withdrew all objections and desired the appeal to proceed.
He was willing to play if he could make "heads I win, tails you lose"
the rule of the game.
These old technical rules are no longer enforced in the country from
which we inherited them. If a defendant appeals from a conviction in
England, the court to which the case goes may increase or decrease the
penalty, take additional testimony or grant a new trial, as the justice
of the case demands. Is it not time that we clothed our criminal law
in some new raiment, cut according to the best English models, rather
than to permit it longer to wear the cast-off garments of the mother
country ?
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Imbued with the ancient idea that the purpose of criminal law was to
protect the accused, the constitutional guaranty of trial by an impartial
jury has been construed to give the accused an almost unlimited right
to challenge jurors. As a consequence more time is often spent in
selecting a jury than should be devoted to the trial. In a very unusual
case more than six thousand men have been called to the jury box, and
three months of time devoted to their examination before twelve jurors
were selected to try the case. It took but eight minutes to empanel the
English jury that tried Dr. Crippen, a world-renowned defendant of two
decades ago.
We pride ourselves that great progress has been made since the
abolition of trial by battle. But do we not reproduce most of the
essential elements of the wager of battle in the modem criminal trial ?
The state and the defendant are represented by hired champions, while
the accused sits serenely watching the contest, wrapped in his mantle of
presumption of innocence with the truth securely locked in his breast,
because of the constitutional guaranty that he shall not be compelled to
be a witness against himself. The outcome of the trial often depends
more largely upon the intellectual strength and skill of these hired
champions than upon the guilt or innocence of the accused, just as the
result of the old wager of battle was determined by the physical strength
of the contestants rather than the truth of the charge against the defendant.
We must not forget that the criminal law, like the tariff, can give over
protection. When society loses faith in the ability of the law to punish
the guilty, it resorts to lynch law and to vigilance committees, while
officers of the law, deprived of the right to examine the accused in open
court, resort to the third degree or sweating process in the secret confines of the prison cell in order to prevent the escape of men whom they
believe to be guilty. Torture has long since been abolished, but in the
third degree we find the rpodern torture, more refined, but often no less
cruel than that of past ages.
The third degree should be prohibited. But we may well doubt if it
will be prohibited so long as it is society's most potent defense against
criminals. Crimes are usually committed in secret. Most frequently
no one sees the more serious offenses except the criminal and his victim,
and often he does not see or cannot recognize his assailant. As long as
our slavish adherence to an archaic rule permits the accused to conceal
the truth with reference to his crime, so long may we expect society to
protect itself by resort to the third degree or other extra-legal means of
finding the truth.
In the days of Raleigh and of Penn, when the accused could not
testify in his own behalf, justice demanded that he should not be com-
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pelled to testify against himself. But now that the accused is a competent witness for himself, an ancient rule established to protect the
defendant from despotic kings should no longer give him an undue
advantage in a trial conducted in a free and enlightened republic.
No injustice has been done to the parties to a civil action by abolishing this archaic rule and by giving their adversaries the right to ex'amine them upon the trial. No injustice will be done
to the defendant
in a criminal case by compelling him to submit to an examination, unless
it be unjust to compel the defendant to tell the truth when the truth
shows him to be guilty. There is no evidence that can give the jury
more light than the truthful answers of the accused.
If a defendant urges the English court of criminal appeal to set aside
his conviction because he is innocent, that court may call the defendant
and ask him the questions that will enable it to determine his guilt or
innocence. Why should Americans hesitate and shudder at the thought
of asking a guilty man the questions that will establish his guilt? If he
be guilty, no rule of law should permit him to conceal that fact. If he
be innocent, the truth cannot harm him.
The tenacity with which we have clung to this old rule well illustrates
the erroneous view that we have taken of criminal law. The long
struggle begun in the days when the pressing need was to establish laws
that should protect the accused has resulted in the deep-seated conviction that the chief purpose to be accomplished by the administration
of criminal law is the protection of the accused. We are beginning to
realize that the finding of the truth, the protection of society against
the criminal rather than the protection of the criminal against society,
is the end that should be attained by the trial of a criminal case. When
applied to the criminal trial of today, the rules that were essential to
protect the accused three hundred years ago put the prosecution to a
disadvantage which may approach that under which Raleigh and Penn
labored.
It is the application of these ancient rules to the modern criminal
trial that is chiefly responsible for the widespread dissatisfaction with
the administration of criminal law. Frequent abortive attempts to
punish defendants whom the public believes to be guilty is breeding a
growing contempt for law and order.
Law must be based on precedent if rights of person and of property
are to be secure. Without fixed and established rules of law'these rights
would be dependent upon the ever changing mind of the mob. Like
Socrates, every man would find that his life depended upon the vote of
the majority of the body of citizens that sat in judgment upon him.
Without law civilization cannot exist. Without law, we must return
to an age where might makes right, we must begin anew our struggle
for Magna Charta.

8
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Those who are impatient with the law's delay forget that law is but
crystallized public opinion, that law will be changed whenever public
opinion demands such change. The defects in the administration of
criminal law which we have discussed are based on provisions of our
constitutions, guaranteeing the rights of accused persons. These constitutions express the will of the people. They are the supreme law
of the land. The law, as enacted by the legislature or as interpreted by
the courts, cannot contravene these constitutional rights of the accused.
The people alone can change these constitutions. Until they do change
them, the people who criticize the law must share with the lawyers
and the courts the responsibility for admitted shortcomings in the administration of the criminal law.

